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Sherman Act Litigation: A Modern

Generic Approach To Objective
Territorial Jurisdiction and the Act of
State Doctrine
I.

Introduction

The doctrine of objective territorial jurisdiction allows courts to
scrutinize activities that occur outside national physical borders but
that impact within those boundaries.' Alleged Sherman Act2 violations constitute the prime targets of this judicial tool.' Although the
vast majority of antitrust improprieties are actually committed
within United States territory and, therefore, create no jurisdictional
I. Generally, "jurisdiction" involves "the power of a state, through its courts, to take
legally effective action." H. GOODRICH & E. SCOLES, CONFLICT OF LAWS 101 (4th ed. 1964).
The traditional strict territorial approach judged the legality of an act according to the law
of the jurisdiction in which it occurred. I P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 261
(1978) [hereinafter cited as I AREEDA & TURNER]. The doctrine of strict territoriality has three
independent advantages: it promotes certainty, facilitates proof of violations, and greatly
reduces danger of affronting foreign sovereigns. Fortenberry, JurisdictionOver Extraterritorial
Antitrust Violations-Paths Through The Great Grimpen Mire, 32 OHIo ST. L.J. 519, 532
(1971). Nevertheless, "a locus-of-behavior test does not respond to each state's legitimate concern with the behavior of its nationals or with internaleffects causedby external conduct." I
AREEDA & TURNER, supra at 255 (emphasis added).
Objective territorial jurisdiction derives from the following principle: "If consequences of
an act done in one state occur in another state, each state in which any event in the series of act
and consequences occurs may exercise legislative jurisdiction to create rights or other interests
as a result thereof." RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 65 (1934). In reality, "courts
but only jurisdiction over acts which
have not purported to exercise extraterritorialjurisdiction
are effective within U.S. territory." W. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST
LAWS 39 (2d ed. 1973).
2. The Sherman Act proscribes agreements in restraint of trade:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
declared to be illegal.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
In the context of trade monopolies, the Sherman Act provides,
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a
felony ....

Id § 2.
These basic formulations have remained unaltered since their promulgation in 1890.
3.
Cf. W. FUGATE, supra note 1, at 36 (courts have applied objective territorial jurisdiction in a great number of cases unrelated to antitrust). See generally Marks, State Department

Perspectives On Antitrust Enforcement Abroad, 13 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 153, 154 (1978) (Antitrust Symposium) (problems encountered in the extraterritorial reach of United States laws are
not unique to antitrust).

difficulties, 4 acts perpetrated in foreign countries' may be reviewed
solely for effects 6 that materialize 7 within our national perimeter.'
In American Banana Company v. United FruitCompany, the initial antitrust case arguably concerning effects caused by extraterritorial activities,' ° Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes proffered a strict
territorial view" in which the Supreme Court precluded jurisdiction
based upon acts transpiring outside the United States.' 2 Subsequent
court opinions, however, recognized the internal effects of extraterritorial restraints of trade, and the American Banana decision was prolifically distinguished' 3 and largely repudiated.' 4
4. See Shenefield, ExtraterritorialImpact of U.S. Antitrust Laws, 5 TRADE REG. REP.
(CCH) 50,386, at 55,838 (1979).
5. See generally notes 66-68 and accompanying text infra. But cf.Shenefield, supra note
4, at 55,838-39 (extraterritorial. antitrust cases inevitably involve some domestic activity).
6. The long-established "effects test" has traditionally required those effects to be direct
and substantial. See, e.g., United States v. The Watchmakers of Switz. Info. Center, Inc.,
[19631 TRADE CAS. (CCH) 70,600, at 77,456 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); United States v. General Elec.
Co., 82 F. Supp. 753, 891 (D.N.J. 1949). See generally I AREEDA & TURNER, supra note I, at
262 n.8; W. FUGATE, supra note 1,at 30, 32; Beausang, The ExtraterritorialJurisdiction Of The
Sherman Act, 70 DICK. L. REV. 187, 190 (1966).

7. Not every case has required that an effect actually be evidenced. An intent to restrain
trade suffices to impose liability under the conspiracy prohibitions of the Sherman Act. See
note 2 supra and notes 79-81 and accompanying text infra. For examples of extraterritorial
conspiracies, see Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); United
States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
8. When restraints occur outside United States territory and do not directly concern
American import or export trade, they are not considered to be in United States domestic or
foreign commerce. Thus, the Sherman Act requires an effect on commerce before jurisdiction
may be granted. In contrast, when restraints manifest within the United States, they are in
commerce and no effect
is necessary to establish subject matter jurisdiction. See Rahl, Foreign
Commerce JurisdictionOf TheAmerican Antitrust Laws, 43 ANTITRUST L.J. 521, 523 (1974). A
good example of an international business operation restraining trade may be found among
hypothetical cases promulgated by the Justice Department to reflect enforcement policy. See
Antitrust Guide ForInternationalOperations, U.S. Gov. Doc. J 1.8/2: An 8/977-2, at 50-52 (rev.
ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as Guide].
9. 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
10. Although Justice Holmes did not engage in an effects analysis with respect to the
conduct charged, later cases certainly utilized that approach. It appears that the Court opened
the door for future judicial determination of effects: "In cases immediately affecting national
interests . . . [nations] may go further still and . . .[extend punishment] to acts done within

another recognizedjurisdiction.'" Id at 356 (emphasis added). In light of the fundamental
importance of United States antitrust law as national policy, objective territorial jurisdiction
would not seem precluded by American Banana. See Guide, supra note 8, at 52. Cf.W. FuGATE, supra note 1,at 43-44 (subsequent case law confirms that the American Banana Court
considered that the complaint alleged insufficient effects upon United States foreign commerce). Curiously, no reference to the American Banana Court's national interests dictum has
been found in case law or literature.
1I. See note I supra.
12. Justice Holmes stated: "But the general and almost universal rule is that the character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the country where
the act is done." American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909).
13. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 609 (9th Cir. 1976). See,
e.g., Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 704 (1962); Timken
Roller Beaing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 605 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting);
United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268, 275-76 (1927); United States v. Nord Deutscher Lloyd, 223 U.S. 512, 518 (1912).
14. Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., Ltd., 594 F,2d 48, 52 (5th Cir. 1979); Hunt
v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68, 74 (2d Cir. 1977). The strict territorial test utilized in Ameri-

Despite ushering out strict territoriality, courts discerned another impediment fatal to successful maintenance of certain Sherman Act proceedings; the judiciary could not question the sovereign
behavior of foreign nations acting within their own boundaries.' 5
From American Banana to the present day, cases have applied the
"act of state doctrine"' 6 to differing factual contexts, using varying
analyses and reaching disparate results. When able to allege foreign
governmental activity connected with their own extraterritorial conduct, private parties sometimes successfully hid behind this act of
state defense.' 7 Current law, however, reveals8 that the defense is
practically unavailable in the private context.'
If construed to reach beyond national boundaries, the Sherman
Act will have massive economic impact on enterprises operating in
foreign countries.' 9 Thus, judicial interpretations of the territorial
limits of the Act are extremely important. Through analysis of recent antitrust law this comment will examine and analyze the tension
between objective territorial jurisdiction as a means of enforcement
and the act of state doctrine as an affirmative defense. To support
this analysis, historical and theoretical background of objective territorial jurisdiction, the Sherman Act, and the act of state doctrine are
presented. Finally, through a discussion of foreign policy, antitrust
enforcement, and economic impact concerns, this comment will
make recommendations for revision of objective territorial jurisdiction analysis.
II.

Background

A.

Objective TerritorialJurisdictionunder the Sherman Act

Sherman Act jurisdiction questions have become increasingly
important. The growth of foreign trade and investment through
business enterprises formed and operated in foreign countries has
raised doubts concerning the competence of United States courts to
can Banana has been discredited since 1945. 1 AREEDA & TURNER supra note 1,at 261. See
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
15. See notes 81-89 and accompanying text infra.
16. The classical statement of the act of state doctrine is found in Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897):
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the
government of another done within its own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of such acts must be obtained through the means open to be availed of by sovereign powers as between themselves.
Id at 252. While Underhillpre-dated American Banana, that earlier decision did not involve
antitrust. Rather, it refused to examine acts of legitimate warfare alleged to have been the
basis of individual liability of a military commander engaged in a foreign civil war. See id at
252-53.
17. See cases cited at note 102 infra.
18. See notes 114-46 and accompanying text infra.
19. See notes 192-96 and accompanying text infra.

exercise jurisdiction over these activities.2" Nevertheless, it is "unrealistic to suppose that a nation's interest in, and control over, its
trade could satisfactorily be confined solely to those foreign trade
activities which take place upon its own soil."' Courts cannot act,
however, without first obtaining personal and subject matter jurisdiction.2 2 The following subsections address the latter jurisdictional
23

requirement.

to eliminate attempts to destroy
1. Validity.-Functioning
2 4 the Sherman Act operates to maxitrade,
competition in foreign
mize consumer welfare.2 5 Proper application of this legislative purpose-protection of competition 26-assures American consumers the
27
benefit of competitive products and ideas offered at the best prices
and manufactured by both foreign and domestic competitors.2 8
Objective territorial application of the Sherman Act therefore
furthers the goals of the antitrust laws. First, it prevents the creation
of foreign havens from which trade can be restrained with impunity.2 9 Second, private suits are provided a forum since foreign
courts are reluctant to entertain actions against their nationals for
20. See Beausang, supra note 6, at 187. The nexus between objective territorial jurisdiction and conflict of laws is unmistakeable. W. FUGATE, supra note 1, at 30. See notes 124-28
and accompanying text infra.
21. W. FUGATE, supra note 1,at 29.
22. Jones, Extraterritoriality in U.S.Antitrust." An International "Hot Potato" 11 INT'L
LAW. 415, 422 (1977).
23. "Basically, subject matter jurisdiction involves the circumstances and rights under
which American courts issue decisions that affect foreign governments either directly or indirectly." Griffin, American Antitrust Law And Foreign Governments, 13 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 137,
137 (1978) (Antitrust Symposium).
Personal jurisdiction has been expanded in modem times "to reach those who transact
business in a certain place, even if they are not 'found' there in a traditional jurisdictional
sense." Guide, supra note 8, at 8. Courts address the issue: "Are such companies doing business of a sufficient character in a judicial district to subject them to the jurisdiction of a United
States district court?" Fugate, U.S. Antitrust Laws and MultinationalEnterprises, 5 TRADE
REG. REP. (CCH) 50,152, at 55,258 (1972) [hereinafter cited as MultinationalEnterprises].
Very few "contacts" are required by some courts. I AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 1,at 25657. For an excellent treatment of the breadth of personal jurisdiction under the antitrust laws,
see Cofinco, Inc. v. Angola Coffee Co., A.C., [2-1975] TRADE CAS. (CCH) 60,456, at 67,051
(S.D.N.Y. 1975). See generally W. FUGATE, supra note 1,at §§ 3.1-3.20; Beausang, supra note
6, at 193-94, 196.
24. "The Sherman Act inhibits contracts, combinations and conspiracies to destroy competition in interstate and foreign trade and commerce, as well as attempts to monopolize such
trade." United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268, 274 (1927).
25. Consumer welfare is the goal of restrictive trade practices legislation. Shenefield,
supra note 4, at 55,837.
26. The Justice Department considers protection of competition to be that agency's sole
concern. MultinationalEnterprises,supra note 23, at 55,257.
27. Clearwaters, Antitrust Laws and Foreign Commerce, 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
50,169, at 55,303 (1973); Marks, supra note 3, at 153.
28. Guide, supra note 8, at 4. "The basis of our antitrust laws is a dedication to the ideal
of free markets at home and abroad, in which numerous private buyers and sellers transact
business without resort to cartels or boycotts." Davidow, Antitrust, Foreign Policy,andInternational Buying Cooperation, 84 YALE L.J. 268, 269 (1974).
29. Shenefield, supra note 4, at 55,837.

violations of American trade regulations. 30
A marvel of brevity, the Sherman Act provides little guidance to
courts that interpret its spatial reach. Absent express congressional
intent to extend jurisdiction beyond national boundaries, however,
objective territorial application of the antitrust laws has relied on
statutory construction. 3 ' Although the Court in American Banana
concluded that all legislation is "fprimafacie territorial, '3 2 subsequent court decisions held that Congress had contemplated that direct and substantial3 3 effects of extraterritorial conduct on United
States domestic and foreign commerce would trigger objective territorial jurisdiction.3 4
The Sherman Act derives its constitutional mandate from the
commerce clause; 35 language comprising the former strikingly resembles the latter. 36 Thus, it is understandable that courts construe
the enactment to include the full scope of the commerce clause,3 7
which comprehends "every species of commercial intercourse between the United States and foreign nations."3
Generally, international law governs extraterritorial jurisdic39
tion. Nevertheless, objective territorial principles permit expansion
of the national judicial sphere of control via an "effects" analysis.'
Some commentators therefore suggest that international law does
not prohibit application of national laws to extraterritorial conduct
generating internal consequences. 4 ' Other writers are more specific:
30. Foreign judicial sanction of governmentalacts is even less likely. I AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 1,at 258.
31. See Jones, supra note 22, at 419; Ongman, "Be No Longer A Chaos" ConstructingA
Normative Theory Of The Sherman Act's ExtraterritorialJurisdictionalScope, 71 Nw. U. L.
REV. 733, 741 (1977).
32. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909).
33. See note 6 and accompanying text supra. See generally Report OfThe Attorney General's National Committee To Study The Antitrust Laws, U.S. Gov. Doc. JI.2:An 8/7, at 76
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Attorney General's Report].
34. But cf.United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945)
(the Sherman Act does not cover agreements made beyond our borders not intendedto affect
commerce, even f they do affect it.) See also I AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 1,at 263 (an
intent to affect commerce may be inferred).
35. In pertinent part, the commerce clause provides: "The Congress shall have Power
. . .To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States .... " U.S.
CONST. art. 1, § 8. See Note, ShermanAct JurisdictionAnd The Acts OfForeign Sovereigns, 77
COLUM. L. REV. 1247, 1249 n.l 1 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Foreign Sovereigns].
36. Ongman, supra note 31, at 736. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976) and 15 U.S.C. § 2
(1976) with U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
37. Pacific Seafarers, Inc. v. Pacific Far East Line, Inc., 404 F.2d 804, 814 (D.C. Cir.
1968), cert. denied 393 U.S. 1093 (1969).
38. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 193 (1824).
39. Beausang, supra note 6, at 188.
40. See notes 1, 6 and 8 and accompanying text supra.
41. "A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal consequences to
REconduct that occurs outside its territory and causes an effect within its territory ....
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 18 (1965). This concept derives from
international case law:
[Ilt is certain that the courts of many countries .... interpret criminal law in the
sense that offenses, the authors of which at the moment of commission are in the

no general agreement among nations upon the reach of a state's antitrust laws or any international system for antitrust exist.4 2 Thus, international law provides no guidance,43 and jurisdictional questions
in antitrust must be answered without reference to world practice."
Views to the contrary, however, indicate that international law must
be considered.4 5 Twenty-five years ago, the Attorney General's National Committee To Study The Antitrust Laws 46 recognized that

objective territorial enforcement 47of the Sherman Act creates "serious
problems of international law."
2. Scope.-Validity of purpose, interpretation, and status
notwithstanding, the intention of United States trade regulation to
include extraterritorial conduct is well established. The scope of extraterritorial activities subject to regulation, however, remains unclear. Critics charge objective territorial antitrust jurisdiction with
vagueness and imprecision, 48 but recognize that it enjoys exceptionally great scope.4 9 This broad reach can be attributed to causally
related problems: judicial inexperience5" and paucity of precedent 5'
necessarily preclude meaningful prediction by corporate counsel of
the extraterritorial activities that will escape Sherman Act coverage.
Aggravating these difficulties, courts have been universally reluctant
to decline jurisdiction in these "international" 52 antitrust cases. 3
Despite the uncertainty regarding the breadth of the Sherman
Act, courts have recognized two factors that constrain the exercise of
jurisdiction: the identities of the parties and the location of the anticompetitive conduct.
territory of another State, are nevertheless to be regarded as having been committed
in the national territory, if. . . especially its effects have taken place there ....
The S.S. Lotus, [1927] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 10, at 23 (emphasis added).
42. See Rahl, supra note 8, at 521-22.
43. The World Court has not considered the Sherman Act's application to extraterritorial
activities. Id at 522.
44. Id at 521.
45. I AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 1, at 267. If international law does control, AmeriThe Pacan courts are competent to apply it: "International law is part of our law .
quette Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
46. See Attorney General's Report, supra note 33.
47. Id at 100.
48. See, e.g., W. FUGATE, supra note 1, at 38; Rahl, supra note 8, at 521.
49. See, e.g., W. FUGATE, supra note 1, at 42; Cira, CurrentProblems In The ExtraterritorialApplicationOf U.S. Antitrust Law, 13 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 157, 157 (1978) (Antitrust Symposium); Rahl, supra note 8, at 523.
50. 10 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 475, 484 (1977).
51. Ongman, supra note 31, at 766.
52. "International" antitrust represents a convenient shorthand reference to American
antitrust law in the objective territorial context. See Ebb, Antitrust And InternationalBusiness
Transactions (pt. 1), 43 ANTITRUST L.J. 517, 518 (1974).
53. As of May 1973 the Department of Justice had filed 248 foreign trade antitrust cases.
Not a single case was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the activities alleged to be illegal.
See W. FUGATE, supra note 1, at 498 app. The American Banana case, a private suit, is the
only antitrust case dismissed for lack of territorial jurisdiction. Rahl, supra note 8, at 521. See
American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 354 (1909).

(a) Identity of the parties.-- Courts and commentators have
agreed virtually without dissent that nations may prescribe rules
governing the extraterritorial activities of their citizens and corporations.54 Difficulties accrue, however, in applying this general rule to
the specific realm of antitrust. Although one writer opts for imposi55
tion of the nationality principle to extraterritorial conduct per se,
other analysts argue that, even with respect to foreign-based behavior of American citizens, those acts must affect United States commerce to trigger antitrust liability.56 This dichotomy of views
notwithstanding, requiring a threshold showing of "effects" creates
no practical bar to jurisdiction. 57 When participants include American enterprises, impact on United States trade is usually quite
clear.58
If Sherman Act jurisdiction is limited in scope to control of
American nationals, alien conduct affecting United States commerce
will be immune to the sanctions of our laws.5 9 The Sherman Act,
however, creates no distinction between nationals and nonnationals.6 0 Accordingly, Department of Justice antitrust enforcement policy provides for equal treatment of American and foreign firms.6'
Despite this theoretical parity, courts, until recently, distinguished
between American and foreign businesses on the basis of national62
ity.
(b) Locus of the restraint.-The location of the alleged anticompetitive conduct represents the heart of the controversy surrounding the scope of the antitrust laws with respect to objective
territorial jurisdiction. Early cases concerning extraterritorial antitrust violations did not rely exclusively on an "effects" test, but ex54. See, e.g., United States v. Pacific & Arctic Co., 228 U.S. 87, 106 (1913); W. FUGATE,
supra note 1, at 43; Fortenberry, supra note i, at 537; Jones, supra note 22, at 422. A corporation's status as a juridical person "'does not preclude consideration of nationality as a factor in
determining whether to exercise jurisdiction."
TIONS LAW § 40, Comment d (1965).

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELA-

55.
56.

See Jones, supra note 22, at 422.
See, e.g., Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1292 (3d Cir.
1979); W. FUGATE, supra note 1, at 43.
57. See note 53 and accompanying text supra.
58. W. FUGATE, supra note 1, at 52. Most objective territorial Sherman Act cases show
participation by United States firms. I AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 1, at 271. See, e.g.,
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 601 (9th Cir. 1976) (United States
parent company); United States v. The Watchmakers of Switz. Info. Center, Inc., [1963]
TRADE CAS. (CCH) $ 70,600, at 77,456 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (United States distributors).
59. Fortenberry, supra note I, at 539. For a summary of the method by which American
courts obtain personal jurisdiction over foreign companies, see Beausang, supra note 6, at 194.
60.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 40, Reporters' Notes at 123

(1965). See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1976).
61. Clearwaters, supra note 27, at 55,302.
62. This nationality distinction required a showing of intent to affect commerce to extend
jurisdiction over a foreign company. National enterprises, however, could not challenge subject matter jurisdiction if they had actually affected commerce, notwithstanding their intent.
See note 70 and accompanying text infra.

pressly conditioned jurisdiction on the physical presence of "some"
illegal activities within the United States. 63 Thus, under the strict
territorial approach of the American Banana decision,' American
courts subjected both nationals and nonnationals to Sherman Act
liability only if those parties had acted partially within American
borders. 65 This approach, however, was quickly repudiated.
(c) Infinite reach.-In United States v. Aluminum Company of
America,6 6 Judge Learned Hand broke the reign of territorial restrictiveness intrinsic to American Banana and its progeny: 67 "[Any
state may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has consequences within
its borders which the state reprehends ....*68 The initial adoption
of an "effects" test, however, contained a limitation based on nationality. While mere effects suffice to inculpate an American corporation, the international complications 69 likely to arise from exercising
jurisdiction over foreign companies caused the courts to require an
additional showing that foreign enterprises intended to restrain
United States trade.7 ° Eventually, however, the intent requirement
to establish jurisdiction disappeared. 7'
3. Application.-Historically, courts applied objective territorial jurisdiction both qualitatively and quantitatively7 2 by using the
following test: has the alleged conduct registered direct and substan63. See United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268, 276 (1927) (a contract, combination and conspiracy was entered into by parties within the United States and made effective by
acts done therein); Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66, 88 (1917) (even if the alleged illegal combination was formed in a foreign country, that agreement was put into operation in the United
States); United States v. Pacific & Arctic Co., 228 U.S. 87, 105-06 (1913) (only part of the
illegal activities were outside the United States; other aspects of the combination and conspiracy occurred inside United States territory).
64. 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
65. See note 63 and accompanying text supra.
66. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
67. See cases cited at note 63 supra. For an excellent discussion of this progression of
case law, see Beausang, supra note 6, at 189-91.
68. 148 F.2d at 443 (emphasis added). Contra,Jones, supranote 22, at 422 (international
law requires at least one of the elements of the crime to have been committed in the nation
asserting jurisdiction over a foreign corporation). Judge Hand referred to his rule as "settled."
148 F.2d at 443. Although the court's rule is generally applied in other areas, no case prior to
Alcoa had applied the concept to antitrust. Cf note 54 and accompanying text supra (nations
may prescribe rules for absent citizens).
69. Traditionally, however, stress on foreign relations was relevant to the act of state
doctrine, not to objective territorial jurisdiction. See note 84 and accompanying text infra.
70. See Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 704-05
(1962) (by implication); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443-44 (2d
Cir. 1945); United States v. General Elec. Co., 82 F. Supp. 753, 890-91 (D.N.J. 1949). "Intent"
bears on the scheme concerned in a conspiracy to restrain trade. Most likely, courts justified
jurisdiction over foreign corporations by focusing on the conspiracy prohibitions of the Sherman Act. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1976).
71. See notes 76-80 and accompanying text infra.
72. But cf.W. FUGATE, supra note 1, at 74 (the character of the restraint, rather than the
amount, is relevant).

tial effects on commerce?7 3 The many semantic variations 74 to this
test and the absence of a definitive scheme for7 its
application, how5
ever, have resulted in repudiation of this rule.
Even though actual effect was traditionally measured by the
"direct and substantial" impact test, when foreign corporations were
parties courts required an intent by those firms to affect commerce.76
Initial cases posited a conjunctive standard, requiring a finding of
"actual effect" and "intent to affect" prior to establishing jurisdiction.7 7 Later decisions, however, promulgated a disjunctive rule that
allowed a showing of either "intent to affect" or "actual effect" to
satisfy the jurisdictional requirement. 78 Because general intent suffices to violate Sherman Act proscriptions,79 the disjunctive approach implicitly recognizes the theoretical irrationality inherent in
demanding an "intent to affect" commerce. Thus, the intent criterion is ignored, and mere consequences of a restraint
of trade consti80
tute infringement of American antitrust laws.
73. See note 6 and accompanying text supra. Department of Justice enforcement policy
evidences a modified standard; "effects" must be "substantial and foreseeable." See Farmer,
Overview of International Operations Guide, 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 50,325, at 55,683
(1979); Guide, supra note 8, at 6.
74. See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 445 (2d Cir.
1945) (intended to affect imports or exports and shown actually to have had some effect upon
them); United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., 100 F. Supp. 504, 592 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (a conspiracy that affects United States commerce); United States v. General Elec. Co., 82 F. Supp.
753, 891 (D.N.J. 1949) (even absent a showing of the extent of restraint, the contract deleteriously affected United States commerce). For a rather complete list of case variations to the
text, see W. FUGATE, supra note 1, at 73-74.
75. In the leading case of Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, the direct and
substantial effects test was expressly jettisoned: "The Sherman Act is not limited to trade restraints which have both a direct and substantial effect on our foreign commerce." 549 F.2d
597, 615 (9th Cir. 1976).
76. See note 70 and accompanying text supra.
77. When both jurisdictional conditions are satisfied - actual effect and intent to affect
- existence of jurisdiction is certainly supported by earlier cases. United States v. Aluminum
Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 444 (2d Cir. 1945). In those early precedents, intent was shown
by proving factual allegations of conspiracy. See, e.g., United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274
U.S. 268, 276 (1927); Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66, 88 (1917); United States v. Pacific &
Arctic Co., 228 U.S. 87, 106 (1913). Justice Holmes stated the outmoded conjunctive test:
"Acts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to produce and producing detrimental effects
within it, justify a State in punishing the cause of the harm as if he had been present at the
effect, if the State should succeed in getting him within its power." Strassheim v. Daily, 221
U.S. 280, 285 (1911). See generally Rahi, supra note 8, at 522.
78. See, e.g., United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., 100 F. Supp. 504, 557 (S.D.N.Y.
1951). See generally I AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 1, at 260; Ongman, supra note 31, at
747-48.
79. The United States Supreme Court explained the intent requirement:
It is, however, not always necessary to find a specific intent to restrain trade or to
build a monopoly in order to find that the anti-trust laws have been violated. It is
sufficient that a restraint of trade or monopoly results as the consequence of a defendant's conduct or business arrangements.
United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 105 (1948). See United States v. General Elec. Co., 82
F. Supp. 753, 891 (D.N.J. 1949); W. FUGATE, supra note 1, at 48.
80. A showing of intent is not required in the subjective sense. Rather, mens rea is supplied if "those responsible for the conduct had reason to foresee that the effect within the
territory would result from the conduct outside." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RE-

B.

Affirmative Defenses

Affirmative defenses limit the scope and application of objective
territorial jurisdiction under the Sherman Act. Two related defenses
are relevant to this discussion: the act of state doctrine and foreign
governmental compulsion.
1. Act of State Doctrine.-Derived from case law,8 ' the act of
state doctrine represents a policy of judicial abstention from inquiry
into the validity of acts by foreign governments.8 2 Neither international law nor the Constitution compel the continuing validity of this
affirmative defense.8 3 Rather, the doctrinal basis rests on "the
proper distribution of functions between the judicial and political
branches of the Government on matters bearing upon foreign affairs."8 4 Thus, it does not reflect deference to foreign sovereign authority,85 as does the defense of sovereign immunity.8 6 Quite apart
from notions of comity,87 judicial declination to review sovereign
acts flows from internal recognition that the executive branch possesses faculties superior to those of the courts in dealing directly with
other nations.8 8 To apply the doctrine, however, courts must examine the nature of the acts alleged and the role of the foreign country in the conduct charged.8 9
(a) Nature of the sovereign act.-Under the act of state doctrine courts are precluded from questioning the validity of public
acts committed by foreign sovereigns in the exercise of their governmental authority within their own territories.9 ° Raising the act of
LATIONS LAW § 18, Comment f (1965). Cf. note 73 supra (Department of Justice enforcement
policy demands substantial and foreseeable effects).
81. Griffin, supra note 23, at 141.
82. Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1292 (3d Cir. 1979).
Doctrinal parameters are examined generally in the leading modem statement of the defense.
See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbation, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
83. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 421, 427 (1964).
84. Id at 427-28.
85. Id at 421.
86. For analyses of the defense of sovereign immunity, see generally I AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 1, at 276; ForeignSovereigns, supranote 35, at 1251-55; Guide, supra note 8, at
8, 61.
87. Basically, the principles of comity "indicate that the laws of the nation with the more
important stake in the matter, based upon its own laws and policies, should prevail." Farmer,
supra note 73, at 55,688.
88.

But see Griffin, A Critique Of The Justice Department'sAntitrust Guide For Interna-

tional Operations, 11 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 215, 243 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Guide Critique]
(the act of state doctrine does not represent a consideration separate from comity, but rather
constitutes a comity exception to conflict of laws principles).
89. Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1293 (3d Cir. 1979);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 41, Comment d (1965).
90. See Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 706 (1976); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 401 (1964); Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68,
73 (2d Cir. 1977); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 41 (1965).

A practical premise underlies the act of state doctrine, which emphasizes substance over

state defense in antitrust actions, however, has led to the creation of
a "commercial exception" to the doctrine. Commercial activities by
foreign nations are deemed jure gestionis (private acts), 9 1 whereas
other governmental actions are considered jure imperil (public
acts).9 2 Derived from the "restrictive theory" of sovereign immunity,9" this doctrinal qualification does not extend to expropriations
by foreign governments.94 A state's taking of property within its own
territory constitutes a typical example of an "act of state" within the
contemplation of the doctrine.9 5 Although Congress legislatively
overruled a specific application of the act of state doctrine to a Cuban nationalization of property,9 6 expropriations generally enjoy a
complete bar to jurisdiction.
(b) Privateparty influence of sovereign acts.-Private party defendants raise the act of state defense when they can allege a link
between their conduct and some foreign sovereign action. 97 While
the significance of that connection may vary in degree, the anticompetitive actions of foreign governments often are conceived and all
but executed by private parties.9 8 In that situation, plaintiffs must
allege that the defendants caused or "catalyzed" the connected foreign state action9 9 since neither the act of state doctrine'0° nor the
Sherman Act'' allow judicial questioning of the validity or legality
of the foreign sovereign action itself. Traditionally, analogy to the
foreign government's own immunity barred inquiry into the private
form. Thus, successful maintenance of that defense has not required the sovereign act to be an
official order, resolution, or decree. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682,
718-20 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
91. Id at 711 app. Nonexempt private acts apparently include conduct by foreign stateowned commercial enterprises. See Guide, supra note 8, at 9.
92. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 711 app. (1976). It should be
noted that a mere plurality of the Dunhill Court assented to establishment of a "commercial
exception." See Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., Ltd., 594 F.2d 48, 52 n.9 (5th Cir.
1979).
93. See generally sources cited in note 86 supra.
94. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964). Bul cf.Alfred
Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 703-05 (1976) (Supreme Court declined to
extend act of state doctrine to acts committed by foreign sovereigns in the course of purely
commercial operations).
95. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 41, Comment d (1965).
96. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1976) (the Hickenlooper Amendment).
97. See generally I AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 1, at 273-75.
98. Farmer, supra note 73, at 55,688.
99. See Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92, 110 (C.D.
Cal. 1971).
100. See note 90 and accompanying text supra
101. "The Sherman Act does not confer jurisdiction on United States courts over acts of
foreign sovereigns. By its terms, it forbids only anticompetitive practices of persons and corporations." Interamerican Ref. Corp. v. Texas Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291, 1298 (D. Del.
1970) (footnote omitted). Cf. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943) ("The Sherman Act
makes no mention of the state as such, and gives no hint that it was intended to restrain state
action or official action directed by a state. The Act is applicable to 'persons' including corporations ....
").

party influence or motivation behind the sovereign behavior.,0 2 Recently, however, a two-step analysis that examines the nature of the
sovereign act and the private party activities triggering it has been
employed. 103
2. Foreign Governmental Compulsion.-Closely related to"°
and derivative from' 0 5 the act of state doctrine, the defense of foreign governmental compulsion excuses' °6 private extraterritorial
conduct otherwise violative of American antitrust laws if a foreign
government requires commission of the anticompetitive acts.' 07 The
defense, however, is not available when the sovereign merely approves of activities that amount to antitrust violations.0 8 Similarly,
compliance with a foreign nation's request, 0 9 or a discharge of discretionary authority bestowed by a foreign sovereign," o fails to meet
the "compulsion" element of the defense. Absent "direct foreign
governmental action compelling the defendants' activities, a United
States court may exercise its jurisdiction . . . [if those acts] have a
substantial and material effect upon our foreign and domestic commerce." " I
Although foreign governmental compulsion closely parallels the
act of state doctrine by viewing foreign sovereign behavior as a
102. See, e.g., American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 358 (1909); Hunt
v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68, 77-80 (2d Cir. 1977); Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes
Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92, 107, 110 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
103. See Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., Ltd., 594 F.2d 48, 51, 55 (5th Cir.
1979). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit noted the contrary position of
the lower court in IndustrialInvestment: "The district court found that the act of state doctrine
prohibited such a 'two-step inquiry.' It concluded: 'Once it is established that the harm complained of was ultimately caused by a governmental act, the motivation behind the act, no
matter how unscrupulous, is beyond judicial review.'" Id at 51. See generally Mannington
Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank
of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
104. Guide Critique,supra note 88, at 248.
105. W. FUGATE, supra note 1, at 82.
106. Foreign governmental compulsion closely resembles common-law duress. Schwartz,
The Anti-Foreign Compulsion Act, 12 INT'L LAW. 649, 656 (1978). For the requirements of
duress, which represents a form of excuse, see R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 954 (2d ed. 1969).

107. See, e.g., Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 70607 (1962); United States v. The Watchmakers of Switz. Info. Center, Inc., [1963] TRADE CAS.
(CCH) 70,600, at 77,456-57 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Multinational Enterprises, supra note 23, at
55,258; Jones, supra note 22, at 427. The foreign governmental compulsion defense touches
only those activities perpetrated within the compelling foreign sovereign's own territory. Cf.
Guide, supra note 8, at 54 (the foreign governmental compulsion defense does not apply to acts
committed within United States territory).
108. In United States v. The Watchmakers of Switz. Info. Center, Inc., [1963] TRADE CAS.
(CCH) 70,600, at 77,456-57 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), the court observed, "[T]he fact that the Swiss
Government may, as a practical matter, approve of the effects of this private activity cannot
convert what is essentially a vulnerable private conspiracy into an unassailable system resulting from foreign governmental mandate."
109. Fugate, The Department of Justice'sAntitrust Guidefor InternationalOperations, 17
VA. J. INT'L L. 645, 689 (1977). See Guide, supra note 8, at 53-57 (Case L).
110. See Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962).
111. United States v. The Watchmakers of Switz. Info. Center, Inc., [1963] TRADE CAS.
(CCH) 70,600, at 77,457 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (emphasis added).

shield to Sherman Act liability, an important distinction exists.
Under the act of state analysis, private party conduct causes or influences the foreign sovereign act. Conversely, the defense of foreign
governmental compulsion applies when the foreign sovereign act
compels anticompetitive activities by private parties.'" 2 The compulsion defense has developed largely through dicta and scholarly writings, usually as an afterthought to discussions of the act of state

doctrine. 13
III. Judicial Gerrymandering
A.

The Timberlane Decision

In a 1976 case, Timberlane Lumber Company v. Bank of
America," 4 defendants" s5 conspired to prevent Timberlane's Honduran subsidiaries from milling lumber and exporting it to the
United States."16 Subsequently, defendants forced termination of
Timberlane's milling operations by obtaining Honduran court-ordered attachments of Timberlane's subsidiaries. Plaintiffs" 7 alleged
that defendants' conduct exerted a direct and substantial effect on
foreign commerce and evidenced an intent to affect United States
trade. Defendants, however, raised the act of state doctrine as a bar
to jurisdiction. 8
Although courts had purported to employ an "effects test" to
resolve the jurisdiction question in objective territorial antitrust
112. See W. FUGATE, supra note 1, at 82.
113. See, e.g., Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 70607 (1962) (nothing indicated that the foreign law had in any way compelled discriminatory
purchasing); United States v. The Watchmakers of Switz. Info. Center, Inc., [1963] TRADE
CAS. (CCH) 1 70,600, at 77,457 ("In the absence of direct foreign governmental action compelling the defendants' activities, a United States court may exercise its jurisdiction as to acts and
contracts abroad.
); W. FUGATE, supra note 1, at 82 (the antitrust-foreign compulsion
principle concerns antitrust liability for acts of private parties initiated pursuant to foreign law
or at the direction of a foreign government). A single case has held foreign governmental
compulsion to bar jurisdiction over plaintiff's action. See Interamerican Ref. Corp. v. Texas
Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del. 1970).
114. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
115. Primary defendants included Bank of America Corporation and its wholly-owned
subsidiary, Bank of America National Trust and Savings Association, which operated a
branch in Honduras. Several Bank of America employees were also named as defendants. Id
at 603.
116. Id at 601.
117. Three plaintiffs were affiliated; these included Timberlane Lumber Company and
Danli Industrial, S.A., and Maya Lumber Company, S. de R.L., which were Honduran corporations incorporated and principally owned by the general partners of Timberlane. Id at 603.
118. Id at 601. Aversion to judicial interference with the conduct of foreign affairs by the
executive branch, opined the court, constitutes the basis underlying the act of state doctrine.
Id at 605. To determine the potential for that interference in a given case, and consequently
the propriety of exercising jurisdiction, the alleged sovereign acts must be examined. Id at
607-08. Of course, this examination of the foreign governmental action cannot operate to challenge the validity of that sovereign behavior. See notes 82 and 99-102 and accompanying text
supra.

cases," 9 the Timberlane court found the "effects" standard inadequate120 and demanded a "more comprehensive inquiry."121
Accordingly, the Timberlane court devised a tripartite analysis.
First, "some" actual or intended effect on American foreign commerce must accrue before courts may legitimately exercise subject
matter jurisdiction. Second, while "some" effect may suffice to establish jurisdiction, a greater showing of restraint may be necessary
to demonstrate an effect "sufficiently large" ioconstitute a civil antitrust violation, which requires cognizable injury to the plaintiffs.' 2 2
Third, and unique to the international setting, United States interests, which include effects on foreign commerce, must be "sufficiently
strong" to justify an assertion of objective territorial authority. ' 23 To
assess the strength of American interests, the court suggested a conflict of laws approach under which both the foreign sovereign and
the United States may exercise jurisdiction over acts occurring in the
former 124 but generating consequences in the latter. 125 In that con-

text, the court adopted a "jurisdictional rule of reason"'' 26 to evaluate
and balance the relevant public interests of the United States and the
foreign sovereign. 127 This balancing determines the forum better
suited to determine the merits of the case.' 12 Declining to exercise
jurisdiction when balancing demonstrates that the foreign nation's
forum constitutes the proper choice of law, American courts avoid
intemperate penetration into the foreign relations sphere of the executive branch.
119. See cases cited at note 6 supra.
120. 549 F.2d at 610 (among United States courts and commentators, no consensus exists
on the proper extent of jurisdiction); Rahl, supra note 8,at 523 (no agreed black-letter rule
articulates Sherman Act commerce coverage).
121. 549 F.2d at 613.
122. Some effect supports the existence ofjurisdiction. Nevertheless, exercise of that jurisdiction hinges on an effect sufficiently large to state a claim. Id. at 615 & n.35.
123. Id at 613.
124. "A state can provide for the creation of interests as a result of acts done in the state or
of events which happen there." RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 64 (1934).
125. See note I supra.
126.

See K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 446 (1958).

127.

For the purpose of balancing, the Timberlane court offered the following factors:
The elements to be weighed include the degree of conflict with foreign law or
policy, the nationality or allegiance of the parties and the locations or principal
places of business of corporations, the extent to which enforcement by either state can
be expected to achieve compliance, the relative significance of effects on the United
States as compared with those elsewhere, the extent to which there is explicit purpose
to harm or affect American commerce, the foreseeability of such effect, and the relative importance to the violations charged of conduct within the United States as compared with conduct abroad.
549 F.2d at 614 (footnote omitted). For the sources of these factors, see K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 446 (1958); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW § 40 (1965).

128. See Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1297-98 (3d Cir.
1979); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 613-15 (9th Cir. 1976). See
generally RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 65, Comment b (1934).

B.

The IndustrialInvestment Decision

In the 1979 decision of IndustrialInvestment Development Cor30
poration v. Mitsui c Co., Ltd, 129 defendants defeated plaintiffs'31
foreign timber concession by causing the Indonesian government to
withhold approval from the joint venture. The district court, however, denied review reasoning that the act of state doctrine prohibited a "two-step inquiry" into the motivation underlying the foreign
32
sovereign's decree. 1
Noting concern for the ramifications of judicial intervention on
executive conduct of international relations, 33 the IndustrialIn vestment court embarked upon a two-pronged balancing test to determine availability of the act of state defense. First, judicial and
executive interests are weighed to determine the branch appropriate
to examine the international aspects inherent in a particular foreign
commerce antitrust case.1 34 Second, courts measure the relative importance of relevant United States and foreign sovereign public interests. For successful maintenance of an act of state defense,
"special political factors" must outweigh United States interest in
regulating domestic and foreign anticompetitive activity.' 35
Participation by a foreign government in extraterritorial restraints of trade does not bestow automatic protection of the act of
state doctrine upon private parties.' 36 Rather, apart from challenging the validity of foreign governmental involvement, the judiciary
may examine private party influence constituting the motivation behind sovereign behavior. 1 37 Indeed, precluding all inquiry into motivation "would uselessly thwart legitimate American goals where
adjudication would result in no embarrassment to executive depart38
ment action."'1
129. 594 F.2d 48 (5th Cir. 1979).
130. Defendants include Mitsui & Co., Ltd., a Japanese corporation, and its American
subsidiary, Mitsui & Co. (U.S.A.), Inc. Id at 49.
131. Named plaintiffs include Industrial Investment Development Corporation, an American corporation, and its two Hong Kong corporate subsidiaries, Indonesia Industrial Investment Corporation, Ltd., and Forest Products Corporation, Ltd. Id at 49 n. 1.
132. Id at 51. See notes 97-103 and accompanying text supra.
133. Id at 51-52. See generally Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398
(1964).
134. Id at 52. The initial step is a separation of powers analysis. Id at 51. See notes 8489 and accompanying text supra.
135. For a domestic commerce corollary in which relative state and federal interests are
weighed, see Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
136. One recent case has been criticized for shielding private parties who can demonstrate
a mere causal relationship between their conduct and some foreign governmental act. See
Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1977). The IndustrialInvestment court, however, expressly rejected that interpretation of Hunt and held that scrutiny of private party
conduct causally related to a sovereign act was not barred. See Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v.
Mitsui & Co., Ltd., 594 F.2d at 54 n. 11,55.
137. Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., Ltd., 594 F.2d at 55.
138. Id. Although the IndustrialInvestment decision seems well entrenched in objective
territorial jurisdiction analysis, the court purported to express no opinion on the scope of the

C.

The Mannington Mills Decision

In Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corporation,3 9 defendant Congoleum had fraudulently procured certain foreign patents.
Subsequently, Congoleum threatened plaintiff Mannington Mills
with foreign infringement suits based on those patents, for which
conduct Mannington Mills later charged Congoleum with violation
of the Sherman Act. Congoleum persuaded the district court that
the act of state doctrine barred review of foreign patent validity, a
question it alleged could properly be addressed only by the courts of
the issuing nations. 4 °
In assessing availability of the act of state defense, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit decided that a judge
must examine the nature of both the anticompetitive conduct and the
role of the foreign sovereign in that activity."'4 If the behavior of the
foreign nation constitutes a simple ministerial act (e.g., a patent issuance), neither the act of state doctrine nor foreign governmental
compulsion provides immunity for the connected private party conduct.' 4 2 If, however, exercise of jurisdiction risks conflict with foreign governmental policy, then the relevant sovereign activity would
be "of substantial concern to the executive branch" in the conduct of
foreign relations 4 3 and judicial deference is necessary even though
related private party violations of the Sherman Act would go unremedied.
This dichotomy concerns a question of exercise, not existence,
of jurisdiction. United States courts have subject matter jurisdiction
over extraterritorial restraints of trade, but should they exercise it?'"
In eschewing "provincial approaches," Mannington Mills substantially adopted the tripartite analysis offered in the Timberlane
case,' 4 5 but refined that methodology by promulgating balancing
Sherman Act. Consideration of the act of state defense, stated the court, was the sole focus.
Id at 49.
139. 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir, 1979).
140. Id at 1290.
141. Id.at 1293.
142. Id at 1294.
143. Id "Substantial concern to the executive branch" constitutes a reiteration of the separation of powers analysis characteristic of both the Timberlane and Industrial Investment
cases. See notes 118 and 134 and accompanying text supra.
144. In his concurrence, Judge Adams explained the dichotomy between existence and
exercise of jurisdiction and registered his disagreement with that approach:
The majority apparently is of the view that the existence of jurisdiction is to be determined solely under an 'effects' standard, but that a court may then decline to exercise
jurisdiction because of considerations of international comity. As I understand it,
however, a court may not abstain where jurisdiction properly lies unless abstention is
warranted under a recognized abstention doctrine. . . . And to my knowledge no
abstention doctrine exists with respect to considerations of international comity.
595 F.2d at 1301-02 n.9 (Adams, J., concurring). See also note 122 supra.
145. See notes 122-23 and accompanying text supra.

factors additional to those advanced in Timberlane. 146
IV.

A Modem Generic Test

Since the American Banana decision' 4 7 courts have searched for
the test with which to determine jurisdiction over extraterritorial restraints of trade. Indeed, the variety of results cannot satisfactorily
be resolved by any degree of analysis. Nevertheless, recent decisions
have combined the consistent aspects of objective territorial jurisdiction and have provided clear guidelines for application of the doctrine. Logical reordering of these judicial guidelines produces an
almost mathematical test: the modem generic approach to objective
territorial jurisdiction under the Sherman Act.
A.

Separation of Powers

Clarification of the separation of powers basis underlying the
act of state doctrine 148 evidences sound judicial reasoning. It recognizes the primary competence of the executive branch in foreign affairs. 149 Improper interference by the judiciary in foreign policy
matters presents dual dangers to executive negotiations with foreign
states. First, a decision declaring foreign sovereign conduct to be
illegal risks serious insult to that country. 5 ° Second, if a court adjudges foreign governmental behavior as legal, then executive bar146. See note 127 supra. A complete list of the factors that the Mannington Mills court
considered crucial follows:
1. Degree of conflict with foreign law or policy;
2. Nationality of the parties;
3. Relative importance of the alleged violation of conduct here compared to that
abroad;
4. Availability of a remedy abroad and the pendency of litigation there;
5. Existence of intent to harm or affect American commerce and its foreseeability;
6. Possible effect upon foreign relations if the court exercises jurisdiction and grants
relief;
7. If relief is granted, whether a party will be placed in the position of being forced to
perform an act illegal in either country or be under conflicting requirements by both
countries;
8. Whether the court can make its order effective;
9. Whether an order for relief would be acceptable in this country if made by the
foreign nation under similar circumstances;
10. Whether a treaty with the affected nations has addressed the issue.
595 F.2d at 1297-98 (footnote omitted).
147. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
148. See notes 83-84 and accompanying text supra. See generally Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d
1287 (3d Cir. 1979); Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., Ltd., 594 F.2d 48 (5th Cir.
1979); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
149. See Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92, 108 (C.D.
Cal. 1971).
150. For example, if "the Executive Branch has undertaken negotiations with an expropriating country, but has refrained from claims of violation of the law of nations, a determination
" Banco Nacional de Cuba
to that effect by a court might be regarded as a serious insult ..
v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 432 (1964). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW § 41, Comment b (1965).

gaining power will wane by effective estoppel.' 5 1
Subordination to the executive in relations with other countries
does not preclude the judiciary from considering foreign relations
issues. 5 2 As the importance of a particular issue to foreign policy
decreases, the justification for exclusive consideration by political
departments diminishes proportionately.1 5 3 When the executive
branch decides in a particular case that judicial intervention is not
inimical to conduct of foreign relations, the act of state doctrine does
not mandate judicial deference.' 5 4 To determine the executive position on a case, courts may request advisory opinions from the State
55
Department to aid in proper disposition of an act of state defense. 1
B.

Private Party Influence of Sovereign Acts

With the propriety of the separation of powers issue of the act of
state defense established, doctrinal coverage of private party conduct
should be analyzed. 56 Rigid focus on the governmental conduct
tempts courts to decline jurisdiction on separation of powers grounds
even when related private party activity is significant. 57 Judicial
recognition of private party influence dramatically increases a plaintiff's ability to show that the connected sovereign act does not constitute the type of foreign governmental conduct most likely of concern
to the executive branch.' 5 8 Thus, when courts address "motivation,"' 5 9 the probability that they will defer to the executive on the
ground of the act of state doctrine is greatly reduced.
Impact or effect on foreign relations tempers judicial treatment
151. It would be extremely difficult for the executive branch to challenge foreign conduct
that has been legitimized by American judicial decree. Thus, "a finding of compliance with
international law would greatly strengthen the bargaining hand of the other state with consequent detriment to American interests." Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,
432 (1964).
152. To be sure, a court ordinarily sees its task as the application of existing legal
rules rather than the resolution of international differences. To some extent, however, the appreciation and reconciliation of such differences underlies the judicial
formulation of relevant legal rules and their interpretation of the relevant statutes.
I AREEDA & TURNER, supra note I, at 260.
153. "[S]ome aspects of international law touch more sharply on national nerves than do
others; the less important the implications of an issue are for our foreign relations, the weaker
the justification for exclusivity in the political branches." Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964).
154. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 41, Comment h (1965).
155. See Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 706-15 app. (1976). When
the State Department wishes to avoid an official stand on the matter, however, courts cannot
seek the Department's aid in weighing the impact of a particular foreign governmental act on
United States foreign relations. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 436
(1964).
156. See note 103 and accompanying text supra
157. See, e.g., American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909); Hunt v.
Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1977).
158. See generaly Foreign Sovereigns, supra note 35.
159. See, e.g., Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979);
Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., Ltd., 594 F.2d 48 (5th Cir. 1979); Timberlane
Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).

of a particular sovereign act, whether the governmental conduct in
question was motivated by a private party or the private anticompetitive behavior was compelled by an act of the foreign state. Because
these two fact patterns reiterate the classic formulations of the types
of conduct covered by the act of state doctrine and foreign governmental compulsion respectively,16 0 a rather startling merger is apparent. Both defenses reflect common dependence on separation of
powers concerns. The same inquiry-impact on foreign relationsis addressed by courts considering either defense.' 6' Balancing factors employed to determine effect on foreign relations are similar in
either case. 162 Thus, in substance, if not in form, the act of state
doctrine and foreign governmental compulsion have been effectively
merged.
C

PracticalConvergence of Procedure and Substance

Objective territorial jurisdiction has expanded significantly.
Even though early decisions admonished that the antitrust laws did
not constitute a dragnet to trap all putative offenders 163 the flexibility
of Sherman Act proscriptions became apparent.'64 Absent statutory
limitation of scope, 65 courts promulgated the semantic 66 effects test
to define the reach of United States trade regulation. Original formulations of this standard required "direct and substantial effects," 167 but subsequent case law demanded only "some effect" 68 to
establish jurisdiction. This latter approach completely abandons
limitations on jurisdiction; 169 any restraint of trade, wherever it may
occur, could arguably have some effect on United States foreign
70
commerce.
160. See note 112 and accompanying text supra.
161. See generally notes 153-54 and accompanying text supra.
162. See notes 127 and 146 and accompanying text supra. Cf. Guide, supra note 8, at 55 (a
balancing of comity interests underlies foreign governmental compulsion). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 40 (1965).
163. See American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909); United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945).
164. "[S]ubstantive antitrust analysis must not be applied mechanically where foreign
contacts are involved-even in the so called per se area." I AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 1,
at 278. The Sherman Act constitutes "an invitation to the judiciary to develop a changing set
of equitable remedies to meet changing restraints in a changing economy." Baker, U.S. Antitrust Enforcement-Crimnal v. Ovil Prosecution, 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 50,341, at
55,695 (1979).
165. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1976).
166. See note 74 and accompanying text supra.
167. See note 6 supra.
168. See Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 613 (9th Cir. 1976).
See also note 122 and accompanying text supra.
169. Terming the "some effect" approach of Timberlane a "jurisdictional rule of reason"
exacerbates the vagueness of effective jurisdictional scope. See A. STICKELLS, FEDERAL CONTROL OF BUSINESS-ANTITRUST LAWS 114 (1972).

170.

"Almost any limitation of the supply of goods in Europe, for example, or in South

America, may have repercussions in the United States if there is trade between the two."

United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945).

Concurrent with the infinite growth of objective territorial jurisdiction has been the progressive surrender of mechanical protection
under the act of state doctrine. By eschewing inflexible rules in favor
of case-by-case approach, the Supreme Court, in Banco Nacionalde
Cuba v. Sabbatino, 7 ' reaffirmed the separation of powers basis of
the act of state defense.' 72 To the degree that the Sabbatino decision
clearly mandates that every case must be evaluated for its impact on
foreign relations, the act of state doctrine no longer provides an impenetrable shield against Sherman Act challenges.
The respective policy bases of objective territorial jurisdiction
and the act of state defense directly oppose one another. The former
counsels judicial action; the latter, judicial restraint. Thus, progressive expansion of objective territorial jurisdiction necessarily engendered gradual contraction of the act of state defense.' 7 3 Recognition
of the converging courses followed by the two doctrines awaited the
decision in Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corporation,174 in
which objective territorial jurisdiction and the act of state defense
were merged. The court's test for determining jurisdiction included
the basic rule for deciding the availability of the act of state defense:
"[p]ossible effect upon foreign relations if the court exercises jurisdiction and grants relief."' 75 Direct treatment of effect on foreign
relations as a jurisdictional matter eliminated the act of state defense
as an inquiry separate from the question of jurisdiction.
D.

Balancing of Interests

The Mannington Mills merger of jurisdiction with the act of
state doctrine extended the analysis of the earlier Timberlane171 6 case
to its logical conclusion. In Timberlane, the court considered the act
of state doctrine independent of its jurisdiction discussion. Objective
territorial jurisdiction required two levels of inquiry. Initially, "effects" on commerce were addressed;' 77 then, United States and foreign public interests relevant to the conduct concerned were
balanced.' 7 8 Despite the Mannington Mills court's "substantial
agreement" with the two-tiered Timberlane test, 179 the court excluded effects criteria from its analysis."'
Inadequacy of the effects test as a jurisdictional rule dictated its
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

376 U.S. 398 (1964).
Id at 427-28. See generally notes 148-54 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 163-72 and accompanying text supra.
595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979).
Id at 1297 (footnote omitted).
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
See id at 613. See generally notes 6 and 122 and accompanying text supra.
See 549 F.2d at 613. See generally notes 123-28 and accompanying text supra
See 595 F.2d at 1297.
See id at 1297-98.

evential demise.' 8 ' Dispatch of that rule, which constitutes the first
tier in the Timberlane test, reduced the Timberlane analysis solely to
the second level 8of2 inquiry: a balancing of United States and foreign
public interests.
In the balancing analysis, however, the Mannington Mills court
combined the foreign relations impact basis of the act of state doctrine with other jurisdictional concerns. 83 Although the current judicial focus on exercise rather than on existence of jurisdiction
requires the act of state doctrine to be considered under the jurisdiction rubric,' 8 4 foreign relations impact does deserve a separate status
under an enlarged test of jurisdiction. That independent status was
granted in IndustrialInvestment Development Corporation v. Mitsui&
Co., Ltd, 185 wherein the court addressed jurisdiction on two levels.
First, foreign relations impact was considered by balancing executive
and judicial interests to determine the branch more appropriate to
inquire into the alleged anticompetitive activities. 8 6 Second, assuming the propriety of judicial action, the court balances both the
United States and foreign public interests to decide which of the nations' forums is more suited to review the averred restraints of
trade. "8' 7 By combining the analyses of the Timberlane, Mannington
Mills, and IndustrialInvestment decisions, the following modem generic test of objective territorial jurisdiction emerges.
First, courts examine the effects on United States foreign relations resulting from exercise of jurisdiction.' 8 8 To evaluate foreign
relations impact, relative interests of the executive and judicial
branches are balanced.' 8 9 If the scale tips in favor of negotiations by
the executive, the court will defer to the executive by declining to
exercise jurisdiction. 9 0 Judicial inquiry would cease at this stage. If
judicial interests are stronger, the next level of analysis will be addressed.
Under a conflict of laws approach, the court balances United
States and foreign public interests to determine which forum should
exercise jurisdiction over the extraterritorial conduct charged.' 91 If
the foreign forum constitutes the proper choice, the court will decline
to exercise jurisdiction and cease consideration of the case. If the
more substantial interests rest with the United States court, jurisdic181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

See notes 49-53 and 72-75 and accompanying text supra.
See note 178 and accompanying text supra.
See note 146 supra.
See generally notes 144-46 and accompanying text supra.
594 F.2d 48 (5th Cir. 1979).
See notes 133-34 and accompanying text supra.
See note 135 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 148-62 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 133-34 and 186 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 148-55 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 123-28 and accompanying text supra.

tion will be exercised and the full merits of the case will be addressed.
V.

Recommendations and Conclusion

Although a balancing analysis within the modem generic test is
the best reasoned approach to objective territorial jurisdiction under
the Sherman Act, that methodology implies limitless judicial control
over extraterritorial restraints of trade.' 9 2 Significant impact on
United States enterprises operating multinationally is inevitable.
The exceptional breadth of Sherman Act jurisdiction may appear to
provide a tenable forum in which United States multinational enterprises can procure redress of antitrust violations by foreign corporations, but that advantage is largely illusory. The universal scope of
antitrust laws does not create a workable forum for United States
corporate plaintiffs since the United States courts cannot enforce
their decrees abroad. 9 3 Rather than providing a means of redress,
expanded jurisdiction will result in substantial economic impact on
United States businesses. If multinational enterprises follow permissive foreign trade regulations, 194 their commercial conduct may violate United States antitrust laws. If those firms do not comply with
foreign practices, however, they may be effectively excluded from
foreign markets.' 9 Thus, almost anomalously, absence of antitrust
196
violations may mean disappearance of all commercial intercourse.
Given this economic dilemma, a slight but important revision of the
modem generic test is appropriate.
192. "Therefore, the American businessman contemplating participation or engaged in
foreign business operations is faced with the decidedly important factor that substantially no
type of foreign operations will be outside of the jurisdictionof the Sherman Act." Beausang,
supra note 6, at 197.
193. First, American courts possess no inherent power to enforce their decrees in foreign
countries. Second, foreign courts do not voluntarily enforce American judicial decrees in those
foreign nations. I AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 1,at 269-70. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 40, Comment e (1965). Third, no international machinery
exists to remedy the American courts' inability to enforce their judgments. W. FUGATE, supra
note 1,at 50. The inability to enforce decrees constitutes an additional mandate for deference
to the executive branch; judicial invalidation of foreign sovereign acts would have no effect on
the foreign government. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 435-36 (1964).
194. Most foreign nations are quite permissive or even encouraging about the formation
of cartels in restraint of trade. Davidow, supranote 28, at 276. But cf.W. FUGATE, supra note
1,at 50-51 (some nations consider United States antitrust jurisdiction to be logical and necessary; if no nation exercised jurisdiction, a vast area of international trade would remain unregulated).
195. A legal dilemma may surface as a corollary to this economic dilemma. In the former,
legal liability as opposed to economic loss is the focus of the courts. In instances in which
American court decrees would force an enterprise to violate the foreign nation's laws, "[c]ourts
and legislatures should take every reasonable precaution to avoid placing individuals in [that]
situation .... ." In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 532 F.2d 404, 410 (5th Cir. 1976). The Mannington Mi/s court included the legal implications of dilemmatic choices as an element in its
balancing test. See note 146 supra.
196. "[I]n some situations foreign governmental regulations or other circumstances of foreign markets might mean that there would be no United States commerce in the absence of the
restraint." I AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 1,at 268.

In balancing United States and foreign public interests with aid
of the criteria offered in ManningtonMills,'9 7 courts should also consider the economic impact of Sherman Act enforcement on United
States multinationals. National interest in prosperous investment in
foreign countries weighs on the foreign public interests side of the
scale and against United States interests tending to support jurisdiction.' 9 8 Thus, the modem generic test would operate as follows:
First, courts evaluate the effect on foreign relations of exercising jurisdiction. Second, if the court does not defer to the executive, national and foreign public interests will be addressed and the
economic impact on United States multinational enterprises will be
particularly emphasized. Modified for economic sensitivity, the
modem generic test of objective territorial jurisdiction under the
Sherman Act envisions disposition of litigation in a manner fair to
national, consumer, and corporate interests.
DANE KELLER RUTLEDGE
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Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979).
See Beausang, supra note 6, at 197.

